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introduction
esTablished in march 2005 To conTinue The work of The inTernaTional criminal Tribunal for The former yugoslavia (icTy),1 the War Crimes Chamber of the 
State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (WCC) faces substantial 
obstacles regarding prosecution of crimes of sexual violence. 
Estimates range from 20,000 to 50,000 wartime rapes in Bosnia 
alone.2 Historically, rape and other crimes of sexual violence 
have gone unaddressed by courts, especially in wartime, and 
many jurisprudential barriers have prevented effective prosecu-
tions. Prosecuting crimes of sexual violence successfully at the 
national level is crucial to bringing a sense of justice to victims 
and their families and ending a culture of impunity. 
Thus far, the WCC has completed at least six trials involv-
ing crimes of sexual violence,3 and additional cases are cur-
rently at trial or in appellate proceedings. This article examines 
how the WCC has treated these prosecutions and analyzes 
numerous challenges, particularly the WCC’s definition of 
rape, and its reliance, or lack thereof, on previous international 
 jurisprudence. 
The WCC has made significant progress in prosecuting 
several rape cases, defining sexual violence, jurisprudentially 
defining sexual slavery and enslavement, and holding that 
rape can constitute persecution and torture. If it is to continue 
successfully prosecuting crimes of sexual violence, however, 
the WCC must: 1) amend its definition of rape to remove the 
requirement of force or the threat of force, and replace it with 
a definition requiring and emphasizing coercive circumstances; 
2) include gender as a basis of persecution when prosecuting 
crimes of sexual violence as persecution, instead of only consid-
ering ethnicity, religion or political views; and 3) improve the 
quality of the Judgments by utilizing international jurisprudence 
from other tribunals.
rape aS deFined By code and JuriSprudence
comparinG BoSnia-herzeGoVina’S deFinition oF  
rape With international StandardS
The Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the 
Code) mostly replicates provisions in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which regards sexual vio-
lence as a crime against humanity. According to both the Code 
and the Rome Statute, specific acts of sexual violence that con-
stitute crimes against humanity include “rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization 
or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.”4 
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The Code, however, further defines rape as, “coercing another 
by force or by threat or immediate attack upon his life or limb, 
or the life or limb of a person close to him, to sexual intercourse 
or an equivalent sexual act.” This language is a misguided addi-
tion because jurisprudence from the ICTY and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) consistently holds that 
force or the threat of force is not an element of rape.5 
Under those established precedents, all crimes of sexual vio-
lence must be committed under coercive circumstances. Courts 
have vacillated on whether absence of consent should be an 
element of rape.6 However, when rape is committed as an inter-
national crime, it involves widespread attacks or armed conflict, 
and thus the circumstances are “inherently coercive and make 
the question of consent redundant.”7 The Akayesu Trial Chamber 
provided the clearest explanation of “coercive circumstances,” 
when it stated:
Coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a 
show of physical force. Threats, intimidation, extor-
tion and other forms of duress which prey on fear or 
desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion 
may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as 
armed conflict or the military presence of Interahamwe 
among refugee women.8
 
This interpretation indicates that while physical force and 
threats are likely sufficient to show that coercive circumstances 
existed, they are not necessary to prove coercion. By noting 
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Akayesu Trial Chamber negated the possibility of non-consent 
as an element of the international crime of rape. Notably, by 
using the disjunctive “or” between the phrases “armed con-
flict” and “the military presence of Interhamwe among refugee 
women,” the ICTR seems to say that coercive circumstances can 
be inherent even in situations in which there is no immediate 
armed conflict, but in which female refugees of one ethnic group 
are in the presence of members of the military of a different 
ethnic group. This becomes a significant ruling when applied to 
the situation in Bosnia (assuming the rule is applicable to inter-
nally displaced persons as well as refugees). The ruling indicates 
that for crimes of sexual violence charged as war crimes, but in 
which it is difficult for the prosecutor to prove armed conflict 
existed at the time and place of the crime, the prosecutor may 
decide to charge the crime instead as a crime against humanity 
— provided it meets the other chapeaux elements — so that the 
element of coercion is already proven if the refugees or inter-
nally displaced persons were in the presence of the armed forces 
of another ethnic group. 
It is uncertain why the Code includes a requirement of force 
or the threat of force. The Code should be amended to re-define 
rape, using a definition, perhaps modeled after that found in 
Akayesu and confirmed in the Č   elebic ́  i case.9 That approach 
is more consistent with international jurisprudence regarding 
force, consent, and coercion. 
adVancementS and retrenchmentS in the War crimeS 
chamBer rape JuriSprudence 
Despite the Code’s worrisome definition of rape, the WCC 
has made several important decisions regarding the conviction 
of rape and its elements that have advanced conformity with 
international standards. First, the WCC decided in Prosecutor 
v. Janković that corroboration of a witness’s testimony is not 
required for crimes of sexual violence. Notably, the WCC held 
that because corroboration is not required for witness testimony 
in general, it cannot be required for witness testimony regarding 
crimes of sexual violence either. It is important that the WCC 
noted this early on in its jurisprudence, in hopes that future 
defendants will not attempt to discredit victim-witnesses who 
are testifying about sexual violence committed against them by 
accusing them of having no corroboration. It is also positive that 
the WCC holds crimes of sexual violence to the same eviden-
tiary standards as other crimes. 
Another positive development is the WCC’s recognition 
that the age of rape victims, many of whom were children and 
teenagers, is an aggravating circumstance. The Samardžić Trial 
Judgment held that raping girls under 16 increases the gravity 
of the crime. The Appeals Chamber further explained that the 
trauma is particularly serious for girls, who are more vulner-
able and are left with “lasting and far-reaching effects on their 
mental and physical health.” Recognizing a victim’s young age 
as an aggravating factor is consistent with the ICTY’s decision 
in Prosecutor v. Deronjić, which noted that, “(t)he Appeals 
Chamber… has often affirmed the use of aggravating factors 
related to victim characteristics such as age.”10 
There have also been setbacks in the WCC’s rape juris-
prudence. First, the WCC has relied on the definition of rape 
in the ICTY’s Kunarac decision, which flies in the face of 
Akayesu by making non-consent an element, thus focusing on 
the victim’s behavior and excluding prosecution of otherwise 
clear cases of coercive sexual violence. The WCC’s Šimšić Trial 
Chamber relied on the Kunarac definition, but did not discuss 
consent; rather it stated, without elaboration, that coercive cir-
cumstances existed. Although consent was not raised here, it 
still seems advisable to rely on a definition that does not include 
non-consent as an element. Adding non-consent to the analysis 
and relying on Kunarac confuses it and invites retrenchment 
to an old view of the elements of rape that was debunked by 
Akayesu. The WCC should refrain from adding non-consent, 
in order to avoid focusing attention on victims’ behavior. 
Additionally, eliminating consent and focusing on coercion will 
enhance predictability and doctrinal clarity, and increase deter-
rence by providing clearer definitional boundaries.
Also worrisome is the WCC’s invocation of morality when 
adjudicating crimes of sexual violence.11 The Stanković Appeals 
Chamber used a rape victim’s morality as a reason to exclude 
the public from her testimony. The Šimšić Trial Chamber went 
even further, stating:
(t)he Court was guided by reason of protection of 
morality in a democratic society, having in mind 
the traditional position of a woman in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina milieu, even where some female wit-
nesses expressed readiness to confront openly with the 
accused during their public confession.12
Scholars criticize invoking morality when discussing crimes 
of sexual violence, often referring to the Geneva Conventions’ 
protection of a woman’s “honor,” as diverting the focus from 
the crime as an act of violence, and focusing on the woman as 
a possession whose virginity is most valuable.13 The Stanković 
Judgment did not need to invoke the victim’s morality; it elabo-
rated other reasons sufficient to justify closing her testimony to 
the public, such as preventing the accused from revealing her 
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identity, protecting her from the trauma of public discussion, 
and protecting her privacy. However, Šimšić seems to create 
the dangerous possibility that, due to a woman’s “traditional 
position” in society (which the WCC failed to define), she may 
be prevented from testifying in public to preserve a sense of 
societal morality, even when she wants to testify in public and 
face her attacker. 
creatinG precedent on the crimeS oF Sexual 
SlaVery and enSlaVement
The BiH Criminal Code includes both enslavement and 
sexual slavery as crimes against humanity. The recognition 
of sexual slavery and enslavement in the context of crimes of 
sexual violence is a recent development in the field of inter-
national criminal law and is significant because it highlights 
the element of ownership of a human being in many crimes 
of sexual violence. Like the Rome Statute, the Code defines 
enslavement as “the exercise of any or all of the powers attach-
ing to the right of ownership over a person, and includes the 
exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, 
in particular women and children.”14 Although the Code and 
the Rome Statute include it as a sexual violence-based crime 
against humanity, both fail to define sexual slavery.15 Unlike the 
Rome Statute, however, the Code does not provide an Elements 
of Crimes section,16 thus leaving the Chambers to define sexual 
slavery through their jurisprudence.
Four of the five sexual violence cases completed by the 
WCC thus far involved charges of either enslavement or sexual 
slavery related to crimes committed by Bosnian Serb military, 
paramilitary, or police forces against Bosniak women and girls 
in the Karaman House, a building that served as a rape camp 
and was frequently referred to as the “Karaman Brothel.”17 In 
the first two cases completed, Samardžić and Stanković, the 
perpetrators were both charged with rape; each seemingly pos-
sessed equivalent rank in the military and committed the same 
crimes.18 Yet the Prosecutor charged Samardžić with sexual 
slavery and Stanković with enslavement, thus indicating that the 
lack of a clear definition leads to inconsistent charges for the 
same conduct.
deVelopment oF the crime oF enSlaVement throuGh 
the StAnkoviććcaSe
While both Stanković and Samardžić were charged with 
bringing girls to Karaman and keeping them as slaves, the WCC 
focused on Stanković’s role in establishing Karaman as a rape 
camp. The Trial Chamber detailed the consistent testimonies of 
five witnesses that established Stanković’s pattern of captur-
ing females and bringing them to Karaman, particularly his 
authoritative role as the person in charge of assigning females to 
soldiers for rape. In establishing enslavement, the Trial Chamber 
noted that Stanković held a position of authority in the house, 
claimed one detainee as his own and treated her as his property, 
approved soldiers for entry to Karaman and “assigned” the girls 
to them, and sometimes brought soldiers to the house himself. 
The Trial Chamber discussed at length his role in subjecting 
female detainees to forced labor. The remainder of the charges 
involved acts of rape and forced labor by the accused. 
It is not clear why the indictment separated the charges of 
enslavement and rape when the actus reus of both are so closely 
related: the rapes occurred in the context of enslavement, and 
a characteristic of the enslavement was rape. The Prosecutor 
may have done this out of caution, as Stanković was not only 
the first case transferred from the ICTY pursuant to ICTY Rule 
11 bis, but the indictment was also one of the WCC’s first to 
include charges of sexual violence.19 Thus, the Prosecutor may 
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form to encourage clear jurisprudential definitions of the crimes, 
as well as to ensure a conviction on at least one of the crimes. 
Or perhaps the Prosecutor viewed enslavement as an umbrella 
crime, with rape being one of the constituent crimes. 
Regardless, the WCC’s interpretation of enslavement fits the 
Code’s definition by focusing on proof that Stanković exercised 
ownership rights over the detained females. Although the deci-
sion does not specifically refer to the ICTY’s more detailed 
elements of enslavement, the WCC’s interpretation of enslave-
ment is consistent with the ICTY’s, which lists as indicia of 
ownership: 
(…) control of someone’s movement, control of phys-
ical environment, psychological control, measures 
taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force 
or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjec-
tion to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality 
and forced labor.20
Finally, it also is not clear why the Prosecutor chose to charge 
enslavement instead of sexual slavery. Because the Code does 
not define sexual slavery, the Prosecutor may have strategically 
chosen enslavement to increase the chances of a conviction for 
a crime with a clear definition. Also, the Prosecutor may have 
wished to draw attention to the non-sexual nature of the forced 
labor for which Stanković was also eventually prosecuted, such 
as forcing the detainees to wake the soldiers, cook, and clean for 
them, as forced labor can demonstrate enslavement.
deVelopment oF the crime oF Sexual SlaVery 
throuGh the Samardži  ́c caSe
The Appeals Chamber sentenced Nedo Samardžić to 24 
years in prison for nine counts of crimes against humanity, seven 
of which involved either rape or sexual slavery. By requiring 
that Samardžić had exercised powers attaching to the rights of 
ownership, and caused the victims to engage in sexual acts, the 
WCC’s definition of sexual slavery matches the Rome Statute’s 
definition. The WCC found that the elements of sexual slavery 
were established in part through witness testimony regarding 
the nature of the Karaman House. The witnesses consistently 
described Karaman as a brothel in which they were traded, 
bought and sold; were forced to cook, clean and do other chores; 
and were subjected to rape almost on a daily basis. The WCC 
also found that Samardžić himself committed multiple rapes.
The ICTY Statute does not define sexual slavery, but crimes 
of sexual violence committed during enslavement have been 
prosecuted as separate crimes against humanity.21 The WCC 
echoed the ICTY Kunarac Appeals decision when it stated that 
a lack of resistance or obvious and constant disagreement to the 
conditions of enslavement cannot be interpreted as consent.22 
Kunarac went on to state that lack of consent is not an element 
of the crime of enslavement, since “enslavement flows from 
claimed rights of ownership.” However, the decision never 
explicitly stated that it relied on Kunarac.
The Samardžić Appeals decision also seemed to apply 
Kunarac by listing the circumstances of the victim’s deten-
tion at Karaman House as being so inherently coercive as to 
make consent a non-issue. Specifically, the surrounding pres-
ence of armed forces and police, the victim’s separation from 
male  family members, and her lack of money or a possibility 
of escape rendered superfluous any inquiry into the presence 
or absence of consent. Samardžić thus created jurisprudence 
consistent with the definition of sexual slavery in the Criminal 
Code of BiH (and in the Rome Statute), as well as with ICTY 
jurisprudence on crimes of sexual violence committed in the 
context of enslavement. 
Jurisprudence on sexual slavery and enslavement in the 
context of crimes of sexual violence is a relatively recent 
development. It constitutes a significant development because 
it highlights patriarchal power structures underlying and permit-
ting many of these crimes. It demonstrates that such crimes do 
not occur as single events, but as part of a contiguous existence 
of ownership that constitutes a crime in itself. However, to best 
combat impunity for crimes of sexual violence involving own-
ership of a person, the WCC should explicitly refer to previous 
international jurisprudence to make its reasoning clear. It also 
must create and maintain jurisprudentially precise and distinct 
definitions of sexual slavery and enslavement to avoid incon-
sistent charging and reflect most realistically the nature of the 
crimes.
crimeS oF Sexual Violence aS perSecution
Prosecutor v. Šimšić is the WCC’s first case convicting an 
accused for sexual violence as persecution. Prosecutions of gen-
der-based crimes of persecution are possible because the Code 
enumerates gender as a prohibited basis of persecution.23 The 
inclusion of gender as a prohibited basis is a new development 
in international criminal law, as neither the ICTY nor the ICTR 
Statutes include it,24 whereas the Rome Statute does. However, 
the indictment did not specify that the persecution was gender-
based; but rather that rape was committed on the basis of 
“political, national, ethnic, cultural and religious grounds.” In 
this sense, the WCC’s interpretation of persecution as related to 
gender mirrors that of the ICTY. 
The ICTY Trial Chamber found in Krstić that rape can be 
committed with persecutorial intent; however, the ICTY limited 
the basis of persecution to the enumerated purposes and did 
not include gender, thus requiring a nexus between the rape 
and another act of persecution based not on gender.25 While 
the WCC’s recognition that rape can be a form of persecution 
is significant, the Prosecution should have tried to prove the 
rapes were committed as persecution not only against Muslims 
because of their religious beliefs and ethnicity, but also that 
the rapes were committed to persecute Muslim women, due to 
their unique characteristics and position in society. The crimes 
committed against them illuminated, took advantage of, and per-
verted roles that women may traditionally play as homemakers, 
as evidenced through forced labor in the form of cooking and 
cleaning, and through their roles as providers of sexual pleasure 
to the soldiers. 
The Prosecutor demonstrated the elements of persecution, 
replicating those laid out in Tadić : that there is a discrimina-
tory act or omission, that the act or omission is based on one of 
the prohibited purposes, and there is an intent to infringe on an 
individual’s enjoyment of a basic or fundamental right.26 The 
Prosecutor could have simultaneously demonstrated that, in 
addition to group membership of the Islamic religion, the detain-
ees were discriminated against on the basis of their gender. 
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crimeS oF Sexual Violence aS torture
Prosecutor v. Janković is the WCC’s first prosecution of rape 
as the crime against humanity of torture. Janković was a leader 
in a paramilitary group and in the Bosnian Serb Army, and 
ordered and perpetrated acts of torture against male and female 
Bosnian Muslims in Foč  a. The WCC analyzed interrogations 
of female detainees to establish the framework for torture. A 
witness testified that Janković demanded she tell him the names 
of her village’s residents and which of them had arms, and that 
he threatened her with gang rape. Though she tried to comply, 
Janković transported her to a barracks on the Drina River where 
he orchestrated a gang rape by at least ten soldiers. The rapes 
took place in a room in which she could hear her uncle outside 
screaming, being beaten, and then being shot. Other witnesses 
who were detained there also testified about interrogations and 
rapes.
The Code’s definition of torture as a crime against human-
ity is identical to the Rome Statute’s, requiring the “intentional 
infliction of severe pain and suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody or under control of the 
accused,” not including suffering resulting from lawful sanc-
tions.27 Both also require that crimes against humanity be 
committed in the course of an attack directed against a civilian 
population that is pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or orga-
nizational policy. The WCC listed the legal requirements of tor-
ture as causing severe pain and suffering, being intentional, and 
having a prohibited purpose. Those requirements are consistent 
with the standard established by the ICTY in Kunarac,28 which 
adopted the Torture Convention’s definition, but excluded the 
Convention’s state action requirement. The ICTY reasoned 
that while human rights law as embodied by the Convention is 
directed at states, international humanitarian law affords more 
protection to individuals and does not require state action.29 
Rape had previously been prosecuted as torture under 
international law. The ICTY in Č  elebic ́ i extensively analyzed 
the requirements of prosecuting rape as torture by examining 
jurisprudence from other international bodies.30 In analyzing 
the case of Mejía v. Peru at the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights,31 the Č  elebic ́ i Trial Chamber deduced that when 
determining whether a rape caused severe pain and suffering, 
one should consider not only the physical effects, but also the 
psychological and social effects of the crime. 
In analyzing the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 
case Aydin v. Turkey32, the Č   elebic ́  i Trial Chamber deduced 
that, because the ECHR stated that it would have reached the 
same conclusion that a rape violated Article 3 of the Euro-
pean Convention (prohibiting torture and cruel and inhuman 
or degrading treatment) even if the victim’s rape had been 
 considered separately from other acts of torture that were com-
mitted against the victim, the ECHR affirmed that rape inflicts a 
level of suffering at such a severe level as to constitute  torture. 
Č  elebic ́ i then referred to Akayesu, which ruled that rape con-
stitutes torture because it constitutes a violation of personal 
dignity, and is used for the same purposes as torture, includ-
ing: “intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, 
 punishment, (and) control or destruction of a person.” Lastly, 
Č  elebic ́ i referred to several United Nations commission reports 
that affirmed rape constitutes a form of torture.33
Janković did not reference Č   elebic ́  i or other international 
 jurisprudence. While decisions of other international tribunals 
are not binding on the WCC, looking to the jurisprudence of 
other tribunals can be very helpful, especially when deciding 
on new issues of law, like the Č  elebic ́ i judgment did when it 
analyzed whether rape can be the basis for a torture prosecu-
tion. This failure to consider previous jurisprudence makes the 
WCC’s judgments more susceptible to criticism; if other parties 
cannot tell on what basis the WCC makes decisions, its dicta and 
holdings are easier to discredit. 
More importantly, although the tribunals’ decisions are not 
binding on one another, the international criminal law con-
cepts created by past jurisprudence have essential normative 
components that are universal, and failing to analyze past case 
law fractures international criminal legal doctrine. In fact, the 
Appeals Chamber often revokes Trial Chamber judgments due 
to a violation of the Criminal Procedure Code, which permits 
vacatur where a Chamber fails to explain the grounds and cite 
reasons for the decision.34 
The tendency to ignore existing jurisprudence could result 
from the newness of Bosnia’s criminal codes and the judiciary’s 
transformation from a civil law system that does not utilize stare 
decisis to more of a common law system. If this is the problem, 
the international judges at the WCC should consider utilizing 
their positions to introduce more analysis of previous decisions 
by international tribunals. 
Regardless of whether Janković should have referenced past 
jurisprudence, its conclusions seem consistent with the state of 
the existing international criminal case law. Aside from meeting 
the Kunarac definition, the WCC also met Akayesu’s prohib-
ited purposes requirement for torture, which lists as prohibited 
purposes:
(a) to obtain information or a confession from the 
victim or a third person; (b) to punish the victim or 
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a third person for an act committed or suspected of 
having been committed by either of them; (c) for the 
purpose of intimidating or coercing the victim or the 
third person; (or) (d) for any reason based on discrimi-
nation of any kind.35
The decision implied first that the Kunarac criteria were 
met, when it explained that the legal requirements for torture 
have been met because the gang-rape caused the witness severe 
pain and suffering, was intentional, and had prohibited purposes. 
It then met the Akayesu prohibited purposes element when it 
explained that the gang-rape was discriminatory as it was based 
on the victim’s ethnicity, that Janković interrogated her to 
extract information, that he intimidated and threatened her with 
rape, and that he punished her for giving dissatisfactory answers 
during her interrogation by orchestrating the gang-rape. 
Interestingly, the Akayesu prohibited purposes element also 
appears separately in Article 190, not under the rubric of crimes 
against humanity, but as a stand-alone crime of torture.36 It is 
unclear why the Prosecutor did not bring an Article 190 charge 
as well, as all of the elements of the crime as listed under 
Article 190 were met. As of this date, the Prosecution has not 
brought any charges for the stand-alone crime of torture, per-
haps because bringing various charges together under crimes 
against humanity or war crimes makes it easier to establish the 
context of the crimes. It may also be because, while torture as a 
crime against humanity requires the attack to be part of a state 
or organizational policy, torture as a stand-alone crime requires 
that the perpetrator either be a public official, or someone with 
the consent of a public official (the “state action” requirement). 
It is generally more difficult to prove the state action require-
ment, which derives from human rights law. Nevertheless, it 
is an important development that the WCC prosecuted rape as 
torture, although it should attempt to deliver clearer decisions 
invoking previous international jurisprudence.
concluSion
The WCC has made important strides in prosecuting crimes 
of sexual violence committed during the war in Bosnia. By rul-
ing that rape can constitute both torture and persecution, and 
that those crimes against youth are particularly grave, the WCC 
has begun to recognize through its jurisprudence that crimes of 
sexual violence are especially serious. Defining sexual slavery 
was another crucial step, as was ruling that corroboration is not 
required for witness testimony on rape. 
Additional progress is needed, however, particularly in tak-
ing the focus off the victim’s behavior. The WCC should amend 
its definition of rape, which currently enables the defense to 
focus on a victim’s behavior by raising force and consent-related 
issues, and replace it with one modeled after Akayesu. This 
would require coercive circumstances and not force or consent, 
reflecting the actual reality of sexual violence and bringing 
the focus back to the perpetrator’s behavior. The WCC should 
similarly stop invoking morality. The WCC has created strong 
jurisprudence on sexual slavery and enslavement, but needs to 
create clearer distinctions between them to allow the Prosecutor 
to most effectively and consistently define and charge crimes, 
and contribute to a greater understanding of the true nature 
of such crimes. As gender is enumerated as a prohibited basis 
of persecution, the WCC should consider gender as a basis of 
persecution, when appropriate, instead of only using national-
ity, ethnicity and religion. Lastly, an abundance of international 
jurisprudence exists from the ad hoc tribunals on crimes of 
sexual violence. The WCC should consult these decisions when 
facing issues of law that is has never faced before. 
The WCC has many challenges before it, and has begun to 
effectively address them. The WCC, however, must address the 
problems discussed to ensure the development of the strongest 
regime for combating impunity for crimes of sexual violence, 
and bringing justice to survivors of atrocities in Bosnia. HRB
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18 Both Samardžić and Stanković were members of the Army of the 
Republika Srpsk and were charged with bringing women and girls 
to Karaman house, keeping them in conditions of enslavement, and 
raping them, as well as forcibly transferring these and other women 
and girls to other buildings used for the same purpose and sharing 
them with other soldiers. See Samardžić Indictment, counts 3, 8, 10, 
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that, only the Šimšić indictment included charges of crimes of sex-
ual violence. See website of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/?jezik=e (follow “Indictments” under 
“Section I”).
20 Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, 
Judgment, ¶ 119 (Appeals Chamber, 22 Mar. 2006).
21 Kelly D. Askin, The Jurisprudence of International War 
Crimes Tribunals: Securing Gender Justice for Some Survivors, in 
lisTening To The silences: women and war 133 (Helen Durham 
and Tracey Gurd eds., 2005). 
22 Samardžić Appeals Judgment, p. 18. The ICTY similarly stated 
that the “lack of resistance or the absence of a clear and constant 
lack of consent during the entire time of the detention” cannot be 
interpreted as consent. Kunarac Appeals Judgment, ¶ 120.
23 Criminal Code of BiH, art. 172(1)(h).
EnDnotEs:  Crimes of sexual Violence in the War Crimes Chamber of the state Court of  
Bosnia and Herzegovina
28
24 The ICTY and ICTR only prohibit persecution based on political, 
racial or religious grounds. See Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 
3217th mtg., art. 5(h), U.N. DOC. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter 
ICTY Statute], and ICTR Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd 
mtg., Annex, art. 3(h), U.N. DOC S/RES/955 [hereinafter ICTR 
Statute]. 
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